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In the

SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
MAMIE NUNNELLEY, et al.,
Plaintiff,
LEWIS L. RIGBY, et al.,
Appellant,
No. 6657

vs.
OGDEN FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN ASSN., et al.,
Respondents.

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF ON APPELLANTS'
PETITION TO MODIFY
R. L. HEDRICK,
E. A. WALTON,
PARNELL BLACK,
Attorneys for Appellants.
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In the

SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH

MAMIE NUNNELLEY, et al.,
Plaintiff,
LEWIS L. RIGBY, et al.,
Appellant,
vs.

No. 6657

OGDEN FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN ASSN., et al.,
Respondents.

On page 3 of their brief counsel quote from the
opinion a few lines on receivership, and, overlooking the
fact that the court is referring to a receiver that might
be appointed by the state court, imply that the Federal
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Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation might be such
receiver.
Reference to 12 U. S. C. .A., sec. 1729 (c), will
disclose that it is only for insured institutions other than
Federal Savings and Loan .Associations that the services of such insurance corporation are available to
courts. .And it seems from 12 U. S. C. .A., sec. 1464,
that the Federal Home Loan Bank Board only can
appoint such corporation as receiver of a Federal Savings and Loan Association.
Is it conceivable that the courts of Utah having undoubted jurisdiction of the merits are powerless to adnlinister equity in these cases~
Counsel's attempt to distinguish Coleman v.
Barnes, 5 .Allen (Mass.) 374, strikes us as being rather
lame. There the Court permitted the joinder of plaintiffs because of the common interest of the plaintiffs in
the goods available to liquidate their several claims, and
it required an equitable re1nedy to furnish the relief
that was due and was sought .
.Again counsel cite Spear vs. Green (Mass.) 140 N. E.
795. That case did not turn on the question of misjoinder of plaintiffs. There, there were seven different
groups embracing forty plaintiffs having several interests in three distinct corporate defendants, and there
was no "common relationship to a definite wrong."
There was a clear misjoinder of causes of action. There
'vas no single class that might have been represented,
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and the holding was that a representative class suit was
not n1aintainable.
In Brown vs. vVerblin, et al., 244 N. Y. S. 209, there
was no question as to a Inisjoinder of parties plaintiff,
and could not have been, because there was only one
plaintiff. The court held that the legal remedy was
adequate and that plaintiff stated no cause of action in
equity. The plaintiff sought to Inaintain the suit as a
representative or class suit, but the complaint failed to
show that the person she sought to represent was
himself interested in any common fund.
The case is so absolutely wanting in appositeness
that we never heretofore in our briefs even referred to it.
Again is cited Ballew Lumber & Hardware Company, et al., vs. ~L P. Railway Co. (~fo.) 232 S. W. 1015.
That case apparently is against our contention. The
l\Iissouri Court relies on but misstates completely the
facts in the case of Tribette, et al, vs. Illinois Central
Power Con1pany, 70 :Miss. 182, 12 So. 32, which case
holds that the Railroad Company could not enjoin a
number of persons from severally prosecuting their several actions at law for damages arising fron1 a single
fire.
But the ~fississippi Court did say that where each of
several plaintiffs could proceed in eq1tity, "their joinder
as plaintiffs or defendants in one suit is not objectionable.''
'Vhile the 1fissouri Court refused to apply such
principle, it treats the 1vlississippi Court's holding that
the injured persons could not have joined even if they
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had tried to do so (which they did not) in a pure actwu
at law, as a precedent for the holding of the Missouri
Court that the plaintiffs in Missouri could not join
in equity to establish and enforce a trust. The case
stands almost alone.
Note also that Missouri is one of the very few code
states that never enacted the statute relating to parties
where they are very numerous, and where there is a
common interest in the same questions. This matter is
referred to in Fourth Edition, Pomeroy Code Remedies,
page 173. Mr. Pomeroy criticises the failur~ of the
1\Hssouri Courts to give effect to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
Rural Credit Subscribers' Assn. vs. J ett, 205 Ky.
603, 266 S. W. 240, is again cited. In that case many
persons attempted to join as plaintiffs and to maintain
a class suit for others. The Court first held (and contrary to what has been held in this case against the respondents) that the several plaintiffs had each a mere
cause of action at law and hence could not join. There
was no common tie or equity. among them. There was
no common or insufficient fund. There was joined with
the plaintiffs' suit against the corporation a pure derivative suit in right of the corporation. (The suit to set
aside the permanent transfers to Colonial Corporation
is not deriveative.)
The Court there held that the plaintiffs' causes of
action were at law and the other and derivative cause
of action was in equity, and so there was a misjoinder
of causes of action. In Kentucky, unlike Utah, equitable
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and legal actions cannot be joined in the smne suit.
See Kentucky Civil Code of Practice, Sections 5,
6, 8, 83.
But as we have heretofore in other briefs pointed
out, Kentucky has held both ways n1any times on the
question of joinder of plaintiffs.
Lile v. Kefauver, et al, 51 S. ,V. Rd. 473, is again
clie~ and counsel say:
''Insolvency and necessity
clain1s were elements.''

of

prorating

Insolvency was 1wt an element; that is to say, no
insolvency of any defendant was alleged. The bank, of
which plaintiffs had been depositors, was insolvent, but
it was not a party to the action. There was no claim
that any of the defendants were insolvent and there was
no suggestion or allegation touching any necessity to
prorate any loss.
Counsel adniit that Black, et al, vs. Simpson (South
Carolina), 77 S. E. 1023, lends support to our contention
as to joinder of plaintiffs, but counsel say that two of
the five judges dissented. It is true that the majority
found but little in the way of a common tie, but they did
assert a common equity in the fact that the defendant
there was a fiduciary of all the plaintiffs and that they
were entitled to an accounting.
The dissenting judges did not refer to such matter and evidently thought that the fiduciary relation was
an insufficient bond or tie. The dissenting opinion
says:
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''This is not a case in which there was a
fraudulent sale of the property of the corporation where the same act necessarily affected all.''
''I do not see a single bond of union.''
''The complaint does not even allege that
the defendant now has the proceeds of sale, and
the plaintiffs are entitled to share in the fund."
Thus the dissenting opinion in its implications as
applied to the facts of this case is favorable to us.
Again counsel refer to Stewart, et al, vs. Ficken,
et al, (South Carolina), 149 S. E. 164, and they intin1ate,
this being a later case, that such weakens or overrules
the Black case.
In the Stewart case:
"The basis of the complaint is that by culpable mismanagement of the affairs of the bank
by the directors' defendants, its assets have been
wasted, producing the failure and loss.''
The Court then proceeded to hold, and correctly,
that the depositor plaintiffs did not own the cause of
action so arising, but that it belonged to the bank, and
also held that the several depositors could not join as
plaintiffs to recover their several deposits. There was
no matter of a common fund, no matter of a necessity
to prorate losses, no matter of fraudulent conveyance of
property to the injury of plaintiffs, or any other matter
of equity tending to tie or unite the plaintiffs.
Then, as to the matter of joinder of the particular
two plaintiffs, the Court cites Fant vs. Brissey, 143
S. C. 264, 141 S. E. 450, a case involving the simple
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principle that where there is no com1non equity, two or
more persons injured by the same tort cannot join.
Apparently counsel fail to get our point based on
the U nifonn Fraudulent Conveyance Act. vVe tried to
point out that such Act sin1ply ren1oves the former requireinent that a creditor or creditors had to have judgments before they could sue to set aside a fraudulent
conveyance, and we showed that fonnerly any number
of creditors could join in such a suit, and the conclusion
i~ inevitable that nonjudg1nent creditors could now join
to set aside a fraudulent conveyance.
Counsel now say that our contention would lead to
the result that all personal injury plaintiffs separately
injured could have all of their cases tried in the same
action. To say the least, this seen1s to be rather farfetched.
However, if there were a number of personal injury
plaintiffs having claims aggregating say a half million
dollars, against an insolvent railroad company, which,
however, was able to pay a substantial portion of the
damage, but not all, we should not hesitate to claim that
such situation would present a case for a proper joinder
in equity.
Or if there were a number of plaintiffs having such
claims against a railroad company which had rendered
itself insolvent bv
of its assets,
. a fraudulent conveyance
.
we should not hesitate to say that they Inight join and
have in one suit full equitable and legal relief.
Counsel, to our minds, have failed to discriminate
between a pure derivative snit in right of a corporation
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and a suit to set aside a fraudulent conveyance. Our
suit here as against the Colonial Corporation is not in
the nature of a stockholders' suit in right of a corporation and is in no sense derivative.
An investing certificate holder stands more in the
relation of a creditor than as a stockholder of an ordinary corporation.
And ''the statute protects all just and lawful actions, etc., whether the demand is one sounding in damages or arising under a contract.''
Bump on Fraudulent Conveyances, 3rd ed. 502.3.
Respectfully submitted,
R. L. HEDRICK,
E. A. WALTON,
PARNELL BLACK,
Attorneys for Appellants.
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